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This paper introduces a new set of financial access 
indicators for 139 countries across the globe and 
describes the results of a preliminary analysis of this data 
set. The new data set builds on previous work using a 
similar methodology. The new data set features broader 
country coverage and greater disaggregation by type of 
financial product and by type of institution supplying the 
product—commercial banks, specialized state run savings 
and development banks, banks with mutual ownership 
structure (such as cooperatives), and microfinance 
institutions. The authors use the data set to conduct a 
This paper—a product of the Financial Access Team in Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Financial and Private 
Sector Development—is part of a larger effort in the department to improve measurement of access to financial services. 
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rough estimation of the number of bank accounts in 
the world (6.2 billion) as well as the number of banked 
and unbanked individuals. In developed countries, 
they estimate 3.2 accounts per adult and 81 percent of 
adults banked. By contrast, in developing countries, 
they estimate only 0.9 accounts per adult and 28 percent 
banked. In regression analysis, they find that measures 
of development and physical infrastructure are positively 
associated with the indicators of deposit account, loan, 
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Financial inclusion—providing access to financial services for the poor—has gained increasing 
prominence in the past few years as a policy objective for national level policy makers, 
multilateral institutions, and others in the development field.  The United Nations designated 
2005 the International Year of Microcredit, adopting the goal of building inclusive financial 
systems, and most other development institutions and multilateral donors have financial access 
on their agenda. Consequently, both private and public funds are flowing to fund various 
financial inclusion initiatives around the world.
1  
The rise of financial inclusion as an important policy goal is due in part to mounting evidence 
that access to financial products can make a positive difference in the lives of the poor. From the 
field, the evidence comes in the form of rapid take-up of financial services when they are made 
available to poor households and the very high rates of repayment that the poor exhibit in order 
to maintain access. The results of the Financial Diaries Project; summarized in the recent book 
“Portfolios of the Poor”, by Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and Ruthven (2009); show how 
dependent the poor are on various financial instruments, both informal and formal, to manage 
what little money they have on a day to day basis. And – though the results do not always 
support preconceived notions prevalent in the microfinance community – an increasing number 
of academic studies show that granting the poor access to financial services can make a 
difference in their lives in various ways [see, e.g. Burgess and Pande (2005), Karlan and Zinman 
(2005, 2009), Dupas and Robinson (2008), Banerjee, Duflos, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2009), 
Bruhn and Love (2009)].
2 In short, as a policy goal, developing more inclusive financial systems 
will continue to hold a place on the policy agenda.  
                                                            
1 For example, in 2008, there was over $11Bn in outstanding investments in MFIs, nearly 50% of which were 
private funds. 
2 For example, three recent randomized control trial studies do not support the vision of microfinance’s main goal 
being to lend to those poor wanting to start or expand a business. Instead, they find that access to consumer credit 
can also improve welfare by (e.g.) keeping people in their jobs (Karlan and Zinman (2005)), that access to 
microenterprise oriented credit is fungible with other forms of household debt and is often used to improve risk 
management rather than to invest in a business (Karlan and Zinman (2009)), and that the presence of a new MFI in a 
neighborhood has no impact on consumption or health and education spending of micro-entrepreneur households 





A necessary step towards achieving an inclusive financial system is to evaluate its status in each 
country. To assist policymakers in designing effective policies and tracking progress in the area 
of financial inclusion at global level, this paper introduces a new set of financial access 
indicators for 139 countries across the globe, and describes the results of a preliminary analysis 
of this data set. 
This data collection effort has its roots in two previous projects carried out at the World Bank. 
The first set of similar indicators of financial access was collected in 2003 for 99 countries (see 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez-Peria (2007)). In this initial effort, data were collected on 
number of loans, deposit accounts, bank branches, and ATMs associated with deposit money 
banks (as defined by the IMF). These indicators were updated for a select set of 54 countries in 
2007 with the “Banking the Poor” report (World Bank (2008)) and augmented with a set of 
survey questions regarding various regulatory features and policy initiatives present in the 
country as well as a survey of the 5 largest banks in the country by total assets which collected 
data on banks’ fees and the procedures clients had to go through to access loans or deposit 
accounts.    
The current set of indicators builds on these two previous works using a similar methodology to 
collect new data through a survey of financial regulators in 139 countries. In addition to being 
more recent and having broader country coverage, this new database features finer 
disaggregation by type of financial product and by categories of the financial institutions 
supplying such products – commercial banks, specialized state run savings and development 
banks, banks with mutual ownership structure (e.g. cooperatives), and microfinance institutions.  
Next, we use this data set to conduct a scoping exercise to estimate the number and distribution 
of bank accounts worldwide as well as the number of banked and un-banked individuals. Our 
estimates suggest that there are approximately 6.2 billion deposit accounts in the world, more 
than one for each adult on the planet. However, these accounts are not evenly distributed. We 
estimate that around 160 million adults in developed countries have no bank account (or 19% of 




countries are un-banked. While these figures are back-of-the envelope calculations, they give a 
sense of the scale of the problem of delivering financial services to the poor.
3  
Finally, we conduct a preliminary analysis of the data and focus on the national level factors 
associated with greater deposit account and loan penetration (measured as number of accounts or 
loans per 1000 adults) and of bank branch density (both relative to population and geographic 
area). We conduct basic cross-country regressions, controlling for income and population 
density, two of the best predictors of the penetration of deposit and loan products in the 
population and of the density of bank branching.
4 Consistent with previous literature, we find 
that controlling for these two factors, the best predictor of deposit account and loan penetration 
as well as branch penetration are measures of the development of physical infrastructure 
including electricity consumption and phone line density. Additionally, lower inflation and the 
presence of explicit deposit insurance are associated with greater deposit penetration. On the 
lending side, higher concentration in the banking sector is significantly associated with lower 
loan penetration, while measures of creditor rights and creditor information availability are 
positively associated with penetration. Finally, none of the policies our survey respondents 
reported employing to boost financial inclusion (such as mandates for basic “no-frills” bank 
accounts, or allowing for agent-based banking) show any significant relationship with our 
measures of loan and deposit penetration. This result however, does not imply that these policies 
are ineffective, but rather an indicator of the large variations the countries pursuing them.
5 
Further analysis, including micro-level studies, is essential to evaluate the effectiveness of 
measures aiming to improve access to financial services. 
                                                            
3 Additionally, these figures do not necessarily equate to percentage of households with bank accounts. 
4 Our hypothesis is that population density is a proxy for the profitability of bank branching both because more 
customers can be reached per branch in dense areas, and because infrastructure and other services are often more 
available in dense areas. When both bank branch density and population are included, branch density is highly 
significant, and the coefficient on population density becomes negative. We use population density because branch 
data are not available everywhere in all countries. 
5 Cross-country regressions are not appropriate for measuring the impact of specific policies, as they rarely capture 
changes in the variables over time. For example, the coefficients of a cross-country regression of a certain policy on 
the number of accounts are likely to be identified by the differences between countries with a large number of 
accounts and no policies in place (perhaps because those countries do not need them) and countries with few 




The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the collection of the data and the survey 
design, Section 3 gives some facts describing the patterns of bank and non-bank supervision 
around the world, and the related patterns of data availability for different elements from the 
survey, Section 4 describes the procedure for estimating the number of accounts world wide and 
the number of banked and unbanked individuals, Section 5 contains the results of the regressions 
with the correlates of deposit, loan, and bank branch penetration. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Description of Data Collection Methodology 
The primary purpose of the Financial Access Survey was to assemble a dataset of measures of 
the breadth of usage of the most basic financial products including deposit accounts, loans, and 
payments. A secondary goal was to measure the pervasiveness of physical access points such as 
bank branches and ATMs which are necessary elements to facilitate broad inclusion. Finally, the 
survey attempts to collect information on some of the policies and practices in each country 
which might affect financial inclusion.  
It is important to distinguish between usage of financial services, which is what we can collect 
data on, and the broader concept of access to finance. A widely cited definition of financial 
access is that outlined by Claessens (2006) who breaks the population into three parts, those who 
have access and use it (group A, included), those who have access but don’t use it (group B, 
voluntarily excluded), and those who don’t have access (group C, involuntarily excluded) where 
“access” is defined equal A + B. He contends that while data on the usage of financial products 
measures A, B is almost impossible to measure, which highlights the difficulty in finding true 
measures of “access to finance”, so defined. While in concept, not being able to measure the 
voluntarily excluded is a major issue, in reality, there are very few households anywhere which 
live in true voluntary financial autarky (though they may choose only informal financial options 
if formal ones are not readily available).
6 The real issue is that usage data is only widely 
                                                            
6 In Portfolios of the Poor, by Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and Ruthven (2009),  the authors show that all 250 of 
the very poor slum residents they study have some form of debt and savings and none use fewer than 4 types of 




available in terms of the volume or number of loans or deposit accounts, but not in terms of the 
number of individuals who own them and thus does not give a clear picture of what percentage 
of households use formal financial services.
7 The Financial Access Survey focuses on measuring 
the usage of a set of basic financial products from various types of formal intermediaries. We 
confirm in Section 3 that the measures we collect correlate strongly with the few available data 
points from household surveys that measure the number of individuals using similar products. 
 To achieve the goal of measuring usage of financial services in the world, access to finance 
questionnaires were sent to 144 countries around the world: 13 countries in East Asia and 
Pacific, 27 countries in Europe and Central Asia, 23 countries in high income OECD region, 21 
countries in Latin America and Caribbean, 14 countries in Middle East and North Africa, 6 
countries in South Asia and 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  For practical reasons, most of 
the small islands and countries at war were excluded from the sample.  The survey was directed 
to the central bank governor’s office or head office of the financial regulator for approval and 
assignment to a contact person, often in the statistics department, who would be responsible for 
gathering the appropriate information. A response was received from 139 countries representing 
90% of the world’s population and 97% of world GDP. For more detail on the coverage of 
individual data elements, see Section 4. 
2.1 Description of Survey 
Data collection was implemented through a regulators’ questionnaire. The questionnaire consists 
of two main parts: statistical questions and regulatory questions. The statistical part of the survey 
collects data on the numbers and volumes of deposit accounts, loans, banking infrastructure (e.g. 
branches and ATMs) and other measures the usage of financial services usage. Table 1 has a list 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
continuously substituting between a variety of formal, semi-formal, and informal financial products based on 
availability, product features, pricing, and other non-price barriers. 
7 This implies a certain rate of double counting since individuals can – and regularly do – own more than one deposit 




of the variables we surveyed in each of three categories. Except for ATMs, debit cards, and POS 
terminals, all elements were asked separately for each institutional category.
8 
Since many low-income individuals get deposit services through institutions which are not 
commercial banks (henceforth, we refer to bank-like institutions which are not commercial banks 
as non-bank financial institutions or non-banks for short),
  we ask for most of the data 
disaggregated into commercial banks as well as a number of non-bank categories.
9 This addition 
represents a major advantage of this study over others that have come before it. One difficulty in 
implementing this approach is that there are many types of financial institutions and each can be 
different from country to country. India, for instance, has commercial banks, Area Banks, Rural 
Banks, various types of Urban and Rural Cooperatives, and many other types of bank-like 
financial institutions, each of which differs in subtle ways from similar institutions in other 
countries.
10 To make the cross-country comparison of the different types possible and 
meaningful, regulated institutions are divided into four main categories and a catchall “other” 
category: 
1)  Commercial banks - banks with a full banking license. In some countries, majority 
government/state owned banks are included in this category to the extent that they perform a 
broad set of commercial banking functions rather than a specialized development role.  
2)  Institutions with a mutual ownership structure (or mutually owned financial institutions: 
MOFIs), such as cooperatives, credit unions or mutual banks.  
3)  Specialized state owned financial institutions (SSFIs) or extensions of the government whose 
main purpose is to lend to support economic development and/or to provide savings, 
payment, and deposit services to the public. This group includes postal banks, government 
savings banks, SME lending facilities, agriculture banks, development banks, etc. 
                                                            
8  World Bank (2008b) presents more detailed data on the status of national payment and securities settlement 
systems worldwide. 
9 In CGAP Occasional Paper No. 8, (2004) the authors refer to these non-bank financial institutions as AFIs for 
“Alternate Financial Institutions”.  
10 The survey asked respondents to list the types of retail financial institutions active in their jurisdiction. Table 1 
gives a fictitious example of the variety of institutions that might be reported (the table was used as an example for 




4)  Microfinance institutions – financial institutions whose primary business model is to lend to 
(and possibly take deposits from) the poor. 
5)  Other – other institutions providing deposit or retail lending services which don’t fall into 
the above categories. 
 
These categories were chosen in part to facilitate the disaggregation of some of the institutions 
which are typically more active in serving financial inclusion policy goals (such as SSFIs) or 
which tend to target middle class or low income clients with basic banking services (MOFIs and 
MFIs). The descriptions of the various categories as they were presented to the survey 
respondents are provided in Table 2. The regulators were asked to use their best judgment to 
choose only one category in which each type of institution fits. In a few cases, regulators could 
not separate data for two types that likely would have fallen into different categories (e.g. credit 
union data could not be separated from commercial bank data in Switzerland) and were asked to 
put them into the category which was dominant, or to leave both categories as missing and 
provide only the system wide total. An example of how the form was filled by a regulator is 
shown in Table 3. 
The MFI category is somewhat problematic in that many institutions which would likely be 
categorized by regulators as falling into the other categories consider themselves to be MFIs. For 
example, deposit taking MFIs are registered as banks in many countries small rural cooperatives 
conduct micro-lending exclusively. Since our main focus is the use of financial services by the 
poor, we decided to keep the MFI category and recognize that in many countries where no data 
was provided, MFIs are grouped in with one of the other categories. 
A second part of the survey contains questions on regulations and policies relating to access to 
financial services, including:  
 
  Financial services provided though the post offices 
  The use of agents and correspondents 




  Bank branch regulations 
  Collateral and lending 
  Transparency and consumer protection  
  Policies promoting of access to finance.  
 
In this part of the survey, we ask regulators to respond with answers that reflect the rules and 
regulations that commercial banks must follow if there is any discrepancy in how the regulations 
apply across institutional categories. 
 
2.2 Implementation of the Data Collection 
 
The questionnaires were sent directly to the head office of the main commercial bank regulator, 
usually the Governors’ offices of Central Banks or Banking Supervisory Agencies. Depending 
on the country and the structure of the Central Bank, the questionnaires were filled out by one or 
several of the following departments: research, statistics, supervision, and/or foreign relations.   
Out of 144 questionnaires sent, 129 countries responded; Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
responded with seven additional unsolicited questionnaires which are included in the dataset.
11 
Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), which accounts for eight countries, did not 
provide a response. Also, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Liberia, Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone did not return the surveys. We discuss response rate and data availability in 
greater detail in Section 3 below. 
To verify the data we conducted multiple phone and email follow-up sessions with any country 
for which clarification was needed. We also conducted a full set of internal consistency checks 
and verified the data against external data sources where available including the IMF-IFS 
statistics, the MIX and data from World Bank (2008) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez-
                                                            
11 Additional surveys were received from Anguilla, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, 




Peria (2007). Where any discrepancies were found, respondents were contacted by telephone or 
email for further clarification. 
Scatter plots of the comparison between the Financial Access Survey commercial bank deposit 
account penetration measure and measures from World Bank (2008) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Martinez-Peria (2007) can be seen in Figure 2. In the two comparisons, differences come 
from changes over time and from the fact that the two previous efforts requested data on all 
deposit money banks which often included cooperatives and credit unions in the total, as is the 
case of Spain, Italy, and Austria. 
2.3 Advantages and Limitations of the Data 
 
Our approach has three important limitations which impact the comparability of our measures 
across countries and the uses to which they can be put: 
Differential reporting: Not all countries report data for the same types of institutions which has 
implications for comparing data across countries. Specifically, data from non-banks seemed to 
suffer from greater underreporting bias than data from commercial banks. This bias expresses 
itself in two ways. First, and most common, many countries did not report anything for certain 
categories of institution (cooperatives for instance) though that type of institution was clearly 
operating within their jurisdiction. Second, in just a few cases, countries reported incomplete 
data for a given category (for instance, if the data reported comprised urban cooperatives but not 
rural cooperatives). Desk research showed this issue was not pervasive and was of small 
magnitude in most cases. For example, data from the Microfinance Exchange (MIX) showed that 
the number of loans and deposits from unregulated NGO-MFIs (which were unlikely to be 
represented in data sent to us by the central bank, since these institutions were not regulated) 
were a small fraction of those from regulated MFIs in most countries, which were again a small 
fraction of total loans. Having data disaggregated into multiple categories and data on which 




Unavailability of Certain Variables: By approaching Central Banks, the variables we can collect 
are often limited to data they have on hand, e.g. that provided in balance sheets, income 
statements, and standard regulatory reports. Many regulators were not able to provide our main 
statistics of interest, which were number of deposit accounts, number of loans, and bank 
branches. In addition, respondents often had trouble disaggregating data in the ways we had 
asked for it. Section 3 below discusses data availability in greater depth.  
Inability to Measure Individuals: Finally, the main outcome variable, number of accounts or 
loans per 1000 adults, is not a perfect indicator of individuals with a loan or a deposit account. 
Double counting is a problem as people may have more than one bank account and/or have 
different accounts with different banks. Also, most countries do not make a distinction between 
government and corporate vs. individual deposit accounts. Another inconsistency stems from the 
different treatment of dormant accounts – some banks close dormant accounts after six months of 
inactivity, while other banks keep dormant accounts open for many years. See section 4.4 for a 
discussion of the correlation between accounts per 1000 adults, and the number of individuals 
with an account, which is strong despite the potential for double counting. 
The main advantages of the approach taken here are the levels of disaggregation achieved both 
by type of product, and type of institution delivering the product. In many cases, respondents 
were able to provide data on the individuals and businesses having loans, as well as finer 
breakdowns for type of deposit account into time, savings, and checking. Disaggregation makes 
the data more useful, but also facilitates greater accuracy by showing more clearly what is 
missing and what is not. 
 
3.  Patterns of Bank Supervision and Data Availability  
Modern financial systems are complex and feature a great variety of regulated and unregulated 
financial service providers. In most countries there is no single central supervisor or coordinating 
entity for all financial institutions. However, the main financial authority, usually a central bank 




about half of the countries in the world (Table 4). In many countries there are also non-bank 
regulatory authorities that may supervise or regulate (to varying degrees) cooperatives and credit 
unions, finance companies, MFIs, etc. 
The patterns of supervision documented in Table 4 have consequences for the response rates for 
different data elements in the survey. Financial regulators tend to collect and publish data on the 
institutions they supervise and the data tend to reflect their policy priorities. This pattern shows 
clearly in Table 5, where volumes of deposits and loans; and data on branches and other forms of 
physical outreach are relatively available, the data on numbers of deposits and loans and 
numbers of individuals are relatively less populated. Volume data comes from balance sheets and 
is reported regularly for monitoring purposes and many countries require registering bank 
branches with the authorities. The collection of data relevant to financial inclusion is rarer, 
however, and is often lower priority and done on an ad hoc basis.
12 
3.1 Data Available on Mutually Owned Financial Institutions (MOFIs) 
Even when financial cooperatives are regulated, few countries are able to provide financial 
access relevant data on them.  In countries where cooperatives are supervised by the main 
financial regulator, less than 60 percent have data on the values of deposits and loans, and just a 
third on the number of accounts and loans.  There is a significant difference in data availability 
by region.  Latin America has the best data coverage with 80 percent of countries collecting data 
on values and 60 percent on numbers of loans and deposits.  Sub Saharan Africa faces the 
greatest challenge in collecting data on cooperatives.  In the region, only 20% of countries where 
cooperatives were regulated by the financial authority, had data on the number of deposits and 
loans. Many cooperatives are small and many of them do not have an MIS or even a computer, 
which likely accounts for some of this trend. 
   
                                                            
12 Many respondents reported collection the data on numbers of loans and deposit accounts in response to our 





3.2 Specialized State-owned Financial Institutions (SSOFIs) 
In most countries (62 out of 80 who report having specialized government institutions) the main 
bank regulator supervises government banks.  Only in 18 countries these institutions are 
supervised by other government agencies, such as ministries of finance for development banks 
and ministries of post and communications for postal banks.  Even though specialized state 
owned institutions are an important provider of services very few countries were able to provide 
values on the outreach of these institutions.  
3.3 Data Available on Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
A specific challenge in measuring microfinance is that it is not necessarily defined by the type of 
institution, but by the market segment these institutions serve.  For example, many cooperatives 
operate in rural and poor areas and provide microfinance services.  In some countries, banks 
entered the space traditionally served by microfinance, such as ICICI in India, Equity bank in 
Kenya, or BRI in Indonesia.  Accordingly, only countries with separate licensing and regulatory 
requirements for MFIs were able to report data separately for these institutions -  though many 
others presumably had healthy MFI sectors where the MFIs are registered as cooperatives, 
banks, or non-bank financial corporation of some other kind. 
There are 57 countries in the world where MFIs are defined for regulation purposes as a separate 
institution type and regulated by the main financial regulator (Table 4).  In 10 of these countries, 
multiple forms of MFIs exist, where at least one is regulated by another regulator.  In these cases, 
there are often NGO MFIs which are loosely regulated by a ministry of the government and 
which provide credit services only, and deposit taking MFIs which are regulated and supervised 
by the main financial regulator. MFIs are supervised by the main financial authority in about a 
half of developing countries.  A notable exception is Africa where in 80 percent of countries 
central banks supervise MFIs.  This is a result of the recent drive to formalize microfinance 





13 Less than 10 percent of high income countries regulate or even have MFI 
institution as a category within regulatory framework.   
3.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 6 presents the summary statistics of the main indicators used in our analysis. As already 
mentioned, data on commercial banks are the most comprehensive. The table also shows 
substantial variance among countries in the different indicators. The mean (median) of deposit 
account penetration in banks is 996 (702) accounts per thousand adults with 25
th and 75
th 
percentile values of 270 and 1498, respectively, while the average balance lies around $7,725 
(3,070) USD. On average, the average balance represents 2.6 times the GPD per capita (median 
= 0.94). The mean (median) of loan penetration in commercial banks is 299 (215) loans per 
thousand adults. The 25
th  and 75
th percentile values for such variable are 42 and 431, 
respectively. The number of loans and the number of deposits per thousand adults in commercial 
banks are positively correlated, with a correlation of 0.72. In contrast, the average number of 
accounts or loans per thousand adults is much smaller in cooperatives, government banks, and 
microfinance institutions; for cooperatives, for example, the mean of such figure is 129. While 
the number of observations is smaller, these figures are not driven by sample selection.  
The average (median) number of branches of commercial banks per thousand adults equals 16 
(13). The penetration of branches among the population is positively associated with deposit and 
credit penetration, with correlations of 0.45 and 0.44, respectively. In contrast, the equivalent 
association with the proxy for geographic penetration is a bit weaker, with correlations of 0.34 





13 BCEAO countries did not respond to the survey. Recent years have seen a large number of African countries 
develop national microfinance strategies including the concept of special regulatory windows for deposit taking MFI 




4.  Financial Access around the World 
In this section, we use the Financial Access Survey data to roughly estimate the distribution of 
rates of deposit account ownership and access to credit around the world. We first use regression 
models and other data sources to fill in missing values for the numbers of deposit accounts and 
loans in different countries. From the filled in estimates we can generate worldwide totals for 
deposit accounts, and the breakdown by country (expressed as maps). We then use household 
surveys to estimate the average number of accounts per account holder which allow us to 
estimate the number of banked and unbanked individuals worldwide and broken into developing 
and developed countries. 
There are two main difficulties which we face in these exercises. First, our estimate of the 
number of accounts per active accountholder comes from a very limited set of household surveys 
and so is quite rough (our error bands are very wide). This is a fundamental limit imposed on us 
by the availability of household survey data and our estimate should be treated as only a rough 
guess. Second, there is significant bias in the reporting of non-bank data relative to commercial 
bank data which we were not able to overcome when filling in the missing data with estimates or 
outside data sources. While we were fairly confident in our ability to generate a reasonable 
econometric model to predict rates of commercial bank account ownership, there were a number 
of factors which made us less confident in any similar attempt with the other categories, 
including the fact that the development these other categories tend to be influenced by specific 
factors in each country. We tried to fill in the missing values from other data sources, especially 
for the two main non-bank categories of MOFIs and SSFIs, but were not confident that the data 
we found were very comprehensive. Thus we expect that our estimates of non-bank accounts are 
extreme lower bounds and should be interpreted as such. Our estimates of commercial bank 
accounts are generated by statistical models and are as likely to be too high as too low for any 
given country, so our estimates of commercial bank account numbers are not lower bounds but 
best guesses. This implies that where we estimate a ratio of non-bank to bank accounts this ratio 




We also made a limited attempt to predict the distribution of commercial bank loans around the 
world. Here, we focused only on commercial banks because of data limitations. We did not 
attempt to estimate an aggregated figure for the number of loans because, unlike deposit service 
providers, there are a large number of non-regulated credit suppliers worldwide, rendering the 
estimation of a meaningful figure through regulatory data practically impossible. 
4.1 Counting the Number of Accounts 
The broad coverage of our data allows us to develop a model to extrapolate out of sample to 
estimate the total number of bank accounts and their distribution around the world. To reach 
these estimates, we start with our survey data and develop a simple regression framework to 
impute values for some countries for which we don’t have commercial bank or cooperative data. 
In addition, we attempt to fill in gaps in the non-bank data with data from other sources, 
including the MIX, CGAPs Occasional paper no. 8, the World Council of Credit Unions annual 
survey, and country sources. In order to express the uncertainty in the estimate we calculate a 
conservative “low estimate”, a “preferred estimate” and a “high estimate” to give a sense of the 
range of values which may apply when we vary our assumptions. To generate the map and the 
count of accounts worldwide, we use the sum of the preferred estimates for commercial banks, 
cooperatives, government banks, and MFIs. The details of how numbers for each bank category 
were estimated are provided below, including the preferred estimate, and the high and low 
estimate reflecting different assumptions: 
4.1.1 Commercial banks 
[Preferred estimate] We first construct a set of regression models to fit the relationships between 
log of account penetration on the LHS and per capita income, size of financial sector, population 
density, value of deposits per capita, number of commercial bank branches per person, and 
whether the country is in the high-income OECD category on the RHS. This specification choice 
reflects a balance between wanting a parsimonious model with reasonable explanations as to 
why each variable should be included (so that we can think through whether the model will hold 




(which would imply more variables and/or a highly non-linear terms). We use log of deposit 
accounts/1000 adults as the LHS variable in the regressions because the relationship with 
observable factors is more straightforward, and because doing so avoids predicting negative 
values for the total number of accounts. Using the log, however, presents a challenge because the 
predicted values must be retransformed and multiplied by adult population to calculate the total 
number of accounts in the country, and this process can induce a bias due to the effects of 
Jensen’s Inequality. There are various methods to correct for this “retransform bias”, but we 
choose the non-parametric smearing method (see Duan (1983)) retransformation correction 
which is robust to non-normal residuals (the residuals from some of our specifications do not 
appear to be normal based on a joint test of skewness and kurtosis). After generating a model, we 
then predict out of sample the number of deposit accounts per 1000 adults for the remaining 
countries and retransform the series to get the total number of accounts in each country. Where a 
given piece of data is missing for a given country (e.g. if we do not know the number of 
commercial bank branches in a country), a model with only the known elements is estimated and 
used to predict the number of deposits for the countries with that data element missing. In all the 
models were able to explain more than 70% of the variation in deposit accounts (within sample) 
and greater than 80% when all predictors were available. Table 7 contains the results of the 
different regression specifications; Table 8 describes the variables used in the different models.  
4.1.2 Cooperatives, credit unions, and other mutually owned banks 
[Preferred estimate] For countries which did not report data on the number of deposit account in 
these institutions, we use the reported numbers of clients from the World Council of Credit 
Unions (WOCCU). In general, the WOCCU numbers should understate the true number of 
accounts in all mutually owned institutions, since they enumerate clients rather than accounts, 
and are voluntarily reported data for credit unions only, not all mutually owned institutions. 
Thus, we believe the WOCCU numbers are a very conservative estimate of the number of 
accounts.
14 For 13 countries in Europe for which there were no WOCCU data, we have data – 
                                                            
14 Nevertheless, there is a chance that some of the WOCCU members are unregulated institutions, and thus that the 




again enumerating the number of clients, not accounts – from the European Association of 
Cooperative Banks (EACB). For a few countries which do not report numbers of accounts or 
clients in the Financial Access Survey, WOCCU, or EACB but which report value of accounts, 
we conduct a simple regression based prediction of numbers of accounts from per capita income 
and the value of accounts in mutually owned institutions relative to total adult population. Table 
9 contains the regression table which has an R
2 of 0.8 with 22 observations. The parameter for 
log of income is -0.93 and the parameter for log of deposits per adult population equals 0.97, 
both significant at 1%. While it might seem somewhat surprising that the coefficient on income 
should be negative, this likely reflects the fact that, conditional on the amount of deposits relative 
to the total population, the higher income the country, the fewer individuals (and thus fewer 
accounts) these deposits represent. As we have a large number of small countries for which no 
data is available, we can also make assumptions about the distribution of the cooperative 
penetration variable for the missing values to improve our estimate. Specifically, in the preferred 
estimate, we assume that the countries with missing values (no reported values, no WOCCU or 
EACB data, and no predicted value from the regression) have an average cooperative deposit 
penetration which is close to the 25
th percentile of the distribution of reported values. This would 
be a reasonable approximation, for instance, if many of the countries which did not report 
numbers had smaller cooperative sectors than the ones who did. As table 10 shows, the bulk of 
the accounts we count (92%) come from actual reported data including our survey data, data 
reported to WOCCU or EACB or from direct communication with regulators (CGAP numbers). 
 [High estimate] The “high estimate” is the same as the preferred estimate with the exception that 
we assume the average of the missing values are closer the 50
th percentile of the observed 
distribution. 
[Low estimate] Here we assume that the missing values are zero. 
4.1.3 Government savings banks 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
that compared to countries for which we have survey responses, WOCCU will overstate the number of accounts in 




[Preferred estimate] The great heterogeneity in the form and function of government banks and 
the likelihood that there is only one or two (or zero) in any given country renders suspect any 
econometric regression estimates as were attempted above for commercial banks. Similar to the 
MOFI estimate, we start with the reported data we have and fill in missing values with data from 
a previous counting exercise conducted by CGAP presented in CGAP Occasional Paper no. 8. 
Since this older data is likely to underestimate the true numbers and because there are many 
countries which likely have government run deposit taking institutions such as national savings 
banks or postal banks but for which we have no data, we believe our estimates understate the true 
value. 
[High estimate] We don’t make a high estimate (i.e. we assume it’s the same as the preferred 
estimate) given the likelihood that there is only one or two (or zero) specialized government 
banks in any given country.  
[Low estimate] We use only our reported numbers and leave out the numbers from CGAP 
Occasional Paper no. 8 on the grounds that in a few cases, they may be double counted as 
commercial banks, despite their state ownership (we believe this is may have occurred in just a 
few cases). 
4.1.4 Microfinance Institutions 
For MFIs, we take data from the MIX and use it to supplement our own data for countries which 
reported nothing. Many MFIs are licensed as a commercial bank, cooperative, or NGO and thus 
might be counted in the numbers for other categories supplied to us by the regulator so we have 
removed cooperatives and banks from the MIX data. Since the MIX data are voluntarily 
reported, and because the data reported to us in our survey covers only 17 countries, we believe 
these estimates are significantly on the low side. Also, though most of the reported account 
numbers from the survey data will be from regulated institutions that have a supervisory 
relationship with the main bank regulator, the MIX includes many institutions which are not 
supervised or regulated. 




The map in Figure 5 shows a total number of deposit accounts per thousand adults using a 
combination of account numbers collected through Financial Access survey where available and 
the estimates generated through the above procedures. The deposit account penetration ratios 
represent all deposit accounts summed across the various categories (in most countries, 
commercial banks are the vast majority). 
As the map shows, rates of deposit account ownership in formal institutions vary greatly around 
the world. Of  the seven countries which have fewer than 100 bank accounts per 1000 adults, 
five are in Africa —Congo D.R., Burundi, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Ethiopia. High income 
countries exhibit the greatest levels of deposits penetration with an average of over 2000 
accounts per 1000 adults.   
Underlying the wide variation in rates of account ownership are large differences in the ability of 
poor households to access formal savings. In recent household surveys, Rwanda, Pakistan, 
Malawi, and Uganda
15 all reported less than 20 percent of households save through formal 
institutions, and Financial Access Survey data shows them to have fewer than 225 bank accounts 
per 1000 adults. In contrast, a recent study by the European Commission calculates that in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, greater than 98 percent of households have bank accounts and 
survey data show them to have over 1500 accounts per 1000 adults in commercial banks.
16 The 
trend is that higher rates of bank account ownership equate to more banked individuals in the 
population (see also section 3 above for the results of regressions of deposit penetration on 
reported numbers of banked adults in a country). 
4.3 The Number of Accounts Worldwide 
Adding all the predicted and reported values puts global number of bank and non-bank accounts 
in the world at approximately 6.2 billion or more than 1 for each adult on the planet (and nearly 1 
for each of the 6.7 billion people on the planet).
17 While there are more than enough accounts to 
                                                            
15 FinScope Rwanda (2008);  FinScope Pakistan (2009) ; FinScope Malawi (2008) ; FinScope Uganda (2006). 
16 In Belgium 3,724 and the Netherlands 1,772 accounts per 1000 adults. European Commission (2008) 
17 These numbers are necessarily rough and likely to have a wide margin of error. In the estimation for commercial 




go around, they are not distributed equally. If we divide the number of accounts in each country 
by the adult population, we obtain an estimated figure of 3.2 accounts per adult in developed 
countries, but fewer than 0.9 accounts per adult in developing countries. It should be noted that 
these accounts are not all held by individuals, but also include accounts held by businesses and 
government agencies.
18  Neither are they evenly distributed within countries; in poorer countries 
household surveys show that the majority of accounts are often held by the well off. 
According to the estimates presented in Table 13, banks are the main providers of deposit 
services holding over 80 percent of all deposit accounts in the world (Table 13).  At least 20 
percent of accounts are held outside the commercial banking sector in cooperatives, credit 
unions, government banks, and MFIs.  Due to data limitations and the conservative nature of our 
assumptions during the counting exercise, the estimate of the number of accounts in non-bank 
institutions is likely more conservative than the one for banks, understating the true size of non-
bank sector. 
Though the numbers are rough, Table 13 shows large differences in the structure of the non-bank 
markets in developing and developed countries. In developed countries, nearly 16 percent of 
accounts are held with cooperatives, credit unions, and other institutions with a mutual 
ownership structure compared to an estimated 3 percent in developing countries (though, again, 
the true share of cooperatives in developing countries is likely to be underestimated). Public 
institutions such as postal and specialized state savings banks are also important providers of 
savings services in developing countries, holding 14 percent of total deposits.  Microfinance 
institutions, as a separately regulated type of institution, hold only about 2 percent of deposits 
and are concentrated in developing countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
larger as it is difficult to tell how many accounts are not being counted in the countries for which no data was 
reported, and how many do not get reported in the countries which did provide numbers.  
18 The Financial Access Survey did not ask for the breakdown of deposit account data by individuals and businesses, 




4.4 Conversion Factor: Converting the Number of Accounts to the Number of Account 
Holding Individuals 
It is possible to convert our data and estimates of the number of accounts in each country into 
rough estimates of the number of banked individuals in each country. To do so, we have to 
estimate a conversion factor, which is the number of accounts in a country, per banked individual 
in each country.
19 We use data from household surveys to estimate the number of individuals 
who have savings accounts in formal financial institutions (which could be any of our 
institutional categories) and divide the number of accounts in the country by this number.  
We begin by evaluating whether our main measure of deposit account penetration, namely the 
number of accounts per thousand adults, are significantly correlated with some more accurate 
indicators of financial access, which are available for some countries through household surveys. 
A regression of the reported rates of formal account ownership from household surveys on our 
proxy for deposit penetration, namely number of accounts per thousand adults (in logarithms), 
shows that the deposit penetration indicator is a good predictor of true financial inclusion, at least 
in the limited sample of countries for which we have comparable household level data. Figure 1 
shows the added variable plot for the log of deposit penetration; the fit is very close. Next, Table 
14 shows the results of three bivariate regressions with rates of account ownership from 
household surveys on the LHS and log of deposit penetration on the RHS. In the first model, 
only surveys completed since 2003 are included, in the second model, the sample is further 
restricted to surveys which have all adults as the survey frame (as opposed to all households), the 
final column are all available surveys (which go back to 2000). The coefficients are largely 
similar across the three samples, and the R
2 is 0.69 and 0.71 when only more recent (and thus 
more accurate) surveys are used. These results confirm that the deposit penetration ratio can be 
used to predict the percent of the population with a bank account to a fair degree of accuracy. 
Table 17 provides a list of household survey data and the sources.  
                                                            
19 This is not necessarily the same as the average number of accounts held by each account holder since business and 




To create our preferred estimate of the conversion factor, we select the available 15 household 
surveys conducted in 6 developing and 9 developed countries since 2003 (see Table 15 for list of 
survey sources) and which have reported data for two categories or more (commercial banks plus 
one of MOFIs or SSFIs).
20 To assure numbers are comparable across countries, we restrict our 
sample to only those surveys which use all adults as the survey universe. The mean value of the 
conversion factor is 2.96 and the 90% confidence interval is from 2.0 to 3.9 (Table 16). As a 
round number, there appear to be approximately 3 accounts per person on average.  
Table 17 also shows two variations to calculate a conversion factor. In the one, we use all 
countries with household survey data and use both predicted and reported values of account 
numbers. This expands the sample to 28 countries and produces an estimate of 3.2 total accounts 
per banked individual for the conversion factor. The final method uses only reported data for 
commercial banks under the assumption that the number of commercial bank accounts provides 
a reasonable signal for estimating the number of individuals with bank accounts. This method 
uses 17 countries and calculates a conversion factor of 2.5 commercial bank accounts per banked 
individual. 
This approach to calculating the conversion factor is admittedly a very rough estimate (as is 
confirmed by the wide confidence intervals). Though we believe the simplicity of the calculation 
is a virtue, there are a few simple corrections which we contemplated, but which the data 
indicated were not warranted.  
First, because the Financial Access survey data on number of accounts comes from 2008 data but 
the household survey data come from various prior years, any worldwide upward trend in 
account ownership would systematically inflate the conversion factor for older surveys. If older 
household surveys systematically underestimate the true number of banked adults who currently 
own accounts, one might expect a negative relationship between survey year and number of 
                                                            
20 We calculate the conversion factor as the number of accounts from all sources relative to the number of banked 
adults. In the conversion factor calculation we drop countries for which we have only commercial bank data and no 
reported number for government or cooperative accounts (3 surveys) so that the conversion factor better measures 
this ratio (rather than measuring the number of commercial bank accounts per banked adults). When we do the final 





banked adults. However, a regression of accounts per adult on the year the household survey 
does not show a significant relationship.  
Second, one might also imagine that the conversion factor would vary significantly with the level 
of economic development of the country, however there was not a significant difference in the 
means between the developing and developed sample nor was there a significant relationship 
when regressing the conversion factor on log of GDP per capita. This result seems surprising, 
given the anecdotal evidence that individuals in richer countries often hold more accounts per 
person. One possible explanation could be that though the typical adult in a developed country 
may have more accounts on than her developing country counterpart, the ratio of business and 
government accounts to individual accounts is likely higher in developing countries (due to 
fewer individual accounts) which drives back up the ratio of accounts to banked adults.
21  
4.5 Estimating the Number of Unbanked Individuals in the World 
To make a final estimate of the number of banked adults around the world, we divide the number 
of accounts in each country by the conversion factor. When the resulting number is greater than 
the number of adults in the country (as was the case in a few countries with higher than 3000 
accounts per 1000 adults) the number of banked adults was set to the total number of adults.  
Assuming 3 accounts per banked adult on average puts the number of un-banked adults in 
developed countries at approximately 160 million or 19 % of all adults, and at 2.7 billion adults 
or 72 % of the adults in the developing countries.
2223 Table 17 shows how this breakdown varies 
using the high and low confidence interval values for the conversion factor.  
                                                            
21 Desk research into a few country examples showed a high ratio of government and business accounts in 
developing countries. 
22 CGAP Occasional Paper no. 8 estimates the number of savings and loan account holders in non-banks to be 500 
million, leaving 2.5 billion poor around the world who do not get services form non-banks. CGAP Occasional Paper 
no. 8 numbers are not directly comparable to the ones presented in this report as they don’t include commercial 
banks and because they add together loan and deposit accounts. Never the less, their estimate of 2.5bn unbanked 
poor is similar in magnitude to the estimate presented here of 2.7bn adults in developing countries (some of which 
may not be poor). 




Clearly the numbers are rough but give a sense of the scope of the problem of financial 
exclusion. In developing countries, somewhere near 70% of adults have no recourse to formal 
savings. These figures present a challenge to policy makers and those in the development community.  
4.6 Estimating the Number of Commercial Bank Loans in the World 
We also made a limited attempt to predict the distribution of commercial bank loans around the 
world for purposes of filling in the map in Figure 6. The prediction exercise is similar, but is 
based on a single regression. The prediction of the number of loans per thousand adults was 
carried out only for commercial banks, mainly because of data limitations. Furthermore, we did 
not attempt to estimate an aggregated figure for the number of loans because, unlike deposit 
service providers, there are a large number of non-regulated credit suppliers worldwide, 
rendering the estimation of a meaningful figure through regulatory data practically impossible. 
The rationale for these covariates is straightforward, as richer countries tend to have more 
developed credit markets, and more and better information exchange among lenders is often 
associated with deeper creditor markets. We model the number of loans per thousand adults (in 
logarithms) as a quadratic function of (the logarithm of) GDP per capita and the 2009 Credit 
Information Index of Doing Business.24 The results are presented in Table 18. Our preferred 
specification is presented in column (1). We estimate this model using a sample of 69 
observations. The adjusted R
2 is 0.82. In column (2), we present an alternative specification 
using the value of loans in commercial banks instead of income per-capita. The idea behind this 
specification is that the average loan is relatively the same across different countries, although in 
reality, this is not the case. The fit in terms of R
2 is slightly better (Adjusted R
2 = 0.86 vs. 0.82); 
however we stayed with our previous specification as GDP per capita is available for a larger 
number of countries.   
Figure 6 shows the worldwide penetration of loans, measured by the number of commercial bank 
loans per thousand adults, using a combination of the numbers collected through the Financial 
                                                            
24 We tried other specifications (using levels instead of logs), but the fit was worst. We also include as explanatory 
variable the ratio of domestic credit to GDP; however, because of our reduced and selected sample of high-income 





Access survey and the estimates generated through the methodology already described. The 
penetration of loans varies widely across countries and is closely correlated with economic 
development. Developed economies have the largest number of loans per thousand adults. 
What’s more, it is likely that this figure underestimates the true amount of loans in these 
countries due to the presence of a large number of highly-developed unregulated lenders. In 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, there are, on average, 367 loans per thousand adults. Latin 
America and South Asia follow with 314 and 268, respectively. Middle East and Africa are the 
least develop markets. 
 
5.  Which Country Characteristics Are Correlated with Outreach of the Financial System? 
This section explores the empirical relationships between our financial access indicators and an 
array of country-level variables that intuition, theory, and previous empirical work suggest might 
be relevant. Cross-country analyses such as these suffer from a number fundamental problems 
(including omitted variables and reverse causality) which make it impossible to infer a causal 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables, even when the regression 
coefficients are statistically significant. In measuring the correlations and conditional 
correlations with regressions we do not hope to imply any causal relationships, but simply to 
map out the main relationships and features of the data. A similar exercise was carried out in 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez-Peria (2007). In that paper, the authors correlate deposit 
and loan penetration with various factors from the empirical literature to explore the 
determinants of financial development. We improve on their effort by using a larger sample of 
countries and newer data. As a rough guide, we rely on the framework outlined by Beck and de 
la Torre (2006) to determine which factors are likely to impact financial outreach and thus 
should be included in our analysis.  
We divide the analysis into three areas: savings, credit, and physical outreach. Table 19 provides 
correlations between all of our indicators of account penetration, loan penetration and 
demographic penetration of branches and all explanatory variables. Tables 20-23 rely on a 




single country-level covariate, for example the quality of information in credit markets, and our 
indicators of financial usage and banking sector outreach, controlling for the overall level of 
economic development and/or population density as a catch of all for the many other factors 
which may affect the outcome variable.
25 Here, the coefficients are identified by the difference of 
these covariates across countries. Throughout our analysis, we categorize the differences in 
development, institutions, and economic policies across countries as arising as the result of 
“market-developing” or “market-enabling” policies.
26   
5.1 Savings 
We begin by studying the determinants of the number of deposit and saving accounts. Here, our 
dependent variable is (the logarithm of) the number of accounts in commercial banks per 
thousand adults. The results are presented in Table 20. We start by analyzing the role of factors 
that generally call for market-developing policies.
27 Specifically, we estimate the correlation 
between the number of accounts per thousand adults and different variables reflecting macro-
economic and development conditions that are likely to affect the supply of deposit services in a 
country. We consider first the role of economic development, income inequality, and population 
density. Broadly speaking, these variables reflect the importance of income and market size on 
the provision of financial services, although they might also be catchall proxies for other factors 
which are correlated with the level of economic development. Consistent with previous research, 
the first column in Table 20 shows that there are fewer accounts per thousand adults in countries 
with low per capita income. In fact, as evidenced by the high R
2 =0.64, GDP per capita accounts 
for a large part of the cross-country variation in deposits penetration. The second column adds 
population density, as measured by (the logarithm of) population divided by area. Even 
controlling for per capita income, density is significantly correlated with the number of deposit 
                                                            
25 We use this specification because there is not enough variation in the data set to identify the coefficients when all 
the variables are included at once. This raises the concern that despite controlling for per capita income, there may 
be important unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated with our covariate of interest. We cannot 
overcome this problem.  
26 Market-developing policies expand the possibilities frontier through structural reforms that improve institutions 
and other state variables. In contrast, market enabling policies modify the incentives and constraints faced by 
financial institutions in different regulatory environments  
27 In Beck and de la Torre (2006) the authors describe factors that call for market developing policies as requiring 




accounts. Population density might be expected to correlate with financial access through a 
number of channels. Among other things, more dense areas are easier to supply with 
infrastructure and other services. Also, since one bank branch can serve more customers in a 
dense area, banks may make greater investments in banking infrastructure in high population 
density areas [see, e.g. Calem and Nakamura (1998)]. In the section on physical outreach, we 
find that density is indeed related to greater branch penetration. Given these results, in what 
follows, we include these two variables as controls for the level of development. In the third 
column, we add the Gini coefficient to the previous model to test any relationship between 
income inequality and account ownership. We find no significant association between the 
income distribution and our dependent variable, after controlling for income per capita and 
population density.
28  
Next, we study the relationship between variables that measure macro-economic stability and 
deposit penetration. Previous research has shown there may be a two-way relationship between 
stability and financial development. On the one hand, inflation and other forms of instability may 
impair the growth of a robust banking sector [see e.g. Rousseau and Wachtel (2001)].
29 On the 
other hand, a strong and well regulated banking sector may dampen macro economic shocks or 
prevent them from occurring thus implying a negative relationship between measures of the 
development of the system and instability [see, e.g. Tornell and Westermann (2003)]. In column 
(4), we add to our basic specification the average inflation (in terms of CPI) during the last ten 
years to proxy for macroeconomic stability. As might be expected from the work cited above, 
inflation has a negative and significant effect on deposit penetration. Yet given the many 
channels by which these variables may affect each other, it is especially important not to impute 
any causal interpretation to the relationships we find. Column (5) studies the association between 
explicit deposit insurance and deposit account ownership. The column shows our basic 
specification and a dummy variable coded one if the country had deposit insurance in 2003 and 
                                                            
28 In an unreported regression, we also include an interaction term of the Gini coefficient and the log of GDP per 
capita. None of the covariates are statistically significant.  
29 In theory, the effect of inflation on savings is ambiguous. In general, while inflation affects negatively the value of 
savings by lowering the real value of wealth, it may also mobilize savings into the system as households might 
prefer to save in banks provided that the nominal interest rate is sufficiently high, rather than in the form of money. 





zero otherwise [data on deposit insurance comes from Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven 
(2005)]. The indicator variable is positive and significant; once we control for per capita income 
and population density, countries with deposit insurance have more accounts per thousand adults 
than countries without deposit insurance.
30 Taken as a whole, there is some evidence that 
macroeconomic stability is associated with a deeper penetration of deposits. 
Columns (6) – (9) present the regression results of the impact of infrastructure and political 
stability on deposit penetration. Deficiencies in infrastructure can drive up costs for financial 
institutions to supply financial services; may impact business activity, reducing demand for 
financial services; and (in the case of transport and information infrastructure) may imply higher 
transaction costs for customers to access services. In fact, countries with higher electricity 
consumption and more phones per capita have, on average, more accounts per adult. In contrast, 
while a deficient transportation infrastructure might increase the cost of outreach into more 
remote areas, the density of roads comes in negatively and not significantly. Although political 
instability and violence can increase the cost of doing business, this variable is not significantly 
associated with deeper penetration once per capita income is taken into account. Finally, column 
(10) considers economies designated “offshore financial centers” by the IMF, whereas we would 
expect to have greater numbers of accounts per resident, as they often hold accounts for large 
numbers of non-residents. The sign of the indicator variable, however, is contrary to expectations 
and not significant, which may reflect the fact that we do not include most of the small islands in 
the Caribbean or the fact that many offshore centers do not specialize in banking services but 




30 Our regression analysis uses an indicator variable that takes one if there is a deposit insurance scheme in place in 
the country, and zero otherwise. This is for simplicity and thus the result should be taken with caution. On one hand, 
the result does not provide any evidence of causality. On the other hand, there is a well established literature 
showing that the moral hazard engendered by overly generous deposit insurance schemes leads to greater instability 
and slower long-run financial development [Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2008)].  
31 In unreported regressions, we estimated separately the relationship between deposit penetration and two indices, 
namely the Creditor Rights Index and the Credit Information Index, controlling for (the logarithm of) per capita 
income and (the logarithm of) population density. Both indices enter with a positive sign and are statistically 
significant. In theory, however, these indices should not affect directly the number of deposit accounts, so it is likely 




The second panel in Table 20 reports the results of the impact of different market-enabling 
policies on the number of deposit accounts [see Beck and de la Torre (2006)]. These policies 
tend to provide incentives (or constraints) to financial institutions to operate more efficiently or 
to broaden their customer base. The one measure of these policies is the level of competition in 
the banking sector. Competitive pressures and the search for profits are key factors for 
institutions to innovate, expand their customer base, and offer accounts to underserved clients. 
Here, we follow Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez-Peria (2008) and proxy competition with 
bank concentration, which we approximate by the share of deposits in the five largest banks. 
Column (12) presents the results. Consistent with the theory, higher concentration in the banking 
sector is associated with lower deposit account penetration, although this result is only 
significant at a 15% level. Next, we analyze the role of bank ownership which is a proxy for the 
threat of entry as well as quality of management. These data are from Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004). Their government and foreign ownership measures are not statistically associated with 
measures of deposit penetration. In columns (15) - (23), we study the relationship between price 
and non-price barriers and financial outreach. We begin by analyzing the role of barriers to open 
a bank account. Our focus here is on five variables: KYC requirements, exceptions to these 
requirements, the existence of regulatory requirements for banks to offer basic or low fee 
accounts, the number of document required, and the minimum balance to open a checking 
account (as percentage of GDP per capita). The first three variables are from the Financial 
Access Database (2009); the fourth is from World Bank (2008); the last one is from Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez-Peria (2008). Broadly speaking, the signs of the coefficients 
support the idea that countries with lower barriers are associated with higher deposit penetration, 
although none of the coefficients are statistically significant. In columns (20) and (21), we assess 
whether policies to encourage people to save, such as tax incentives or annual fees, are 
associated with deeper deposit penetration. Neither variable enter significantly. Finally, in the 
last two columns we investigate whether regulatory policies aimed to foster financial inclusion 
are associated with a deeper account penetration. Specifically, we study the role of agents and 





32 In the later case, we use a dummy variable that equals one if 
financial services are offered in the post offices and are handled by a separate private operator 
and zero otherwise. These variables are from the Financial Access Database (2009). Although 
the signs are as expected, none of these policies are significantly associated with broader 
access.
33 This evidence, however, is not enough evidence to suggest that these policies do not 
matter.  
5.2 Credit 
Table 21 presents the regressions of those factors associated with loan penetration, in which the 
dependent variable is (the logarithm of) the number of outstanding loans in commercial banks 
per thousand adults in 2008. In addition to costs, the outreach in the supply of credit (unlike the 
supply of deposits) is constrained by risks, in particular default and agency risks. Therefore, the 
penetration and quality of credit depends not only on the economic conditions, but also on the 
financial infrastructure available to manage these risks. 
  We start by analyzing the relationship between measures of economic and development 
conditions and loan penetration. In the first regressions, we only include (the logarithm of) per 
capita income and (the logarithm of) population density as independent variables. Not 
surprisingly, GDP per capita explains a large part of the cross-country variation. Since 
population density is not statistically significant, in subsequent regression, we only include (the 
logarithm of) GDP per capita as control. 
 
In terms of structural factors, inequality and inflation appear in the regressions with a negative 
sign, but neither is statistically significant. Columns (5) - (7) parallel the results of the previous 
sub-section, namely that better physical infrastructure is positively and significantly associated 
                                                            
32 We tried an alternative specification using a dummy variable coded one if the country allows the use of agents. 
The coefficient is not statistically significant. These variables, however, measure regulations at a very high level. 
Interviews with policymakers show that these regulations often contain detailed provisions, making implementation 
difficult and reducing uptake suggesting that more granular data on regulations are necessary to draw conclusions. 
33 Allowing private entities to provide financial services through postal agencies enters significantly if we do not 




with loan penetration. In column (8) we include contract enforcement days as a proxy for the 
efficiency of the legal system. In principle, loans should be more prevalent in more efficient 
legal systems. While this variable usually enters significantly in other work using private credit 
to GDP as dependent variable
34, the coefficient here is not statistically significant. A possible 
explanation is that the quality of courts matters for business loans, but not so much for individual 
loans which constitute a large proportion of loans granted by commercial banks. Column (9) 
shows no significant relationship between political violence and number of loans. Finally, 
columns (10) and (11) consider the role of financial infrastructure which creates mechanisms for 
lenders to screen borrowers and enforce repayment. As proxies for such mechanisms, we use the 
Creditor Right Index developed by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) following La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) and the Credit Information Index 
introduced by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and updated in “Doing Business 2009” 
[World Bank (2009)]. The results show that the number of loans per thousand adults increases as 
the contractual and informational frameworks, as measured by these two indices, improve.  
The bottom part of Table 21 explores the relationship between policies that may broaden access 
and the penetration of loans in the population across countries. In column (12), we include into 
our baseline regression our proxy for bank concentration. Concentration tends to be negatively 
and significantly associated with the supply of credit. The ownership structure of the banking 
sector, in contrast, is insignificantly correlated with the loan penetration. Columns (15) – (18) of 
Table 20 add to our baseline regression four measures of non-price barriers to accessing credit: 
(1) The number of locations to submit a loan application, (2) the minimum amount of consumer 
loan banks make expressed as a percent of GDP per capita, (3) the average fees banks charge on 
consumer loans expressed as percentage of GDP per capita, and (4) the average number of days 
banks take to process a typical consumer loan application. All these figures are from Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez-Peria (2008). Holding per capita income constant, these barriers 
are not significantly correlated with the penetration of loans in the population. The last column 
                                                            




explores the role of extending credit through agents and uses an index of credit services that 




Financial inclusion is unlikely to improve without sufficient physical access points where clients 
can access the financial system. A client who must travel long distances to the nearest branch or 
ATM to deposit or borrow a few dollars is likely to opt out of the formal financial system. 
Evidence seems to support this story. In columns (11) and (12) in Table 20, for instance, we 
show that there are more deposit accounts per thousand adults in countries with deeper 
demographic and geographic branch penetration. And research indicates that banks also find it 
difficult to lend to distant clients, especially to more “informationally opaque” clients such as 
SMEs [Petersen and Rajan (1995), Mian (2006)]. Another line of research shows that developing 
financial services at the local level can improve local GDP growth and other economic outcomes 
[see Kendall (2008), Burgess and Pande (2005), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004)]. Since 
the extension of financial services to more localities is mostly a matter of increased branching, 
these results show the importance of analyzing outreach as its own phenomenon.  
To evaluate some of the factors associated with more intensive physical outreach, Table 22 and 
Table 23 present OLS regressions using several measures of economic and institutional 
conditions that, in theory, influence transaction costs and therefore, can limit access to financial 
services. In these tables, we use the number of branches per 100,000 people and the number of 
branches per squared km (both in logs) as measures of demographic and geographic branch 
penetration, respectively. The first column in both tables presents our basic specification. Not 
surprisingly, the evidence shows a strong positive correlation between both measures of outreach 
and GDP per capita. In contrast, population density is statistically significant only in the 
geographic specification. In the second column, we investigate the relationship between income 
distribution and outreach. Contrary to the results in the previous sections, income inequality is 
                                                            
35 It is worth noting that both variables (operations savings and operations credit) reflect the regulations as written 




negatively correlated with both, demographic and geographical outreach. Column (3) shows no 
statistically significant relationship between the rate of inflation and any of our outreach 
measures. In contrast, indicators of physical infrastructure are positively associated with banking 
sector outreach, possibly because good infrastructure reduces the costs of opening and operating 
branches (though there are many other unmeasured factors which may also drive the result). 
Column (8) shows that, after controlling for the effects of income and population density, there is 
no significant correlation between absence of violence and neither of our measures of outreach. 
Contrary to our previous results, concentration is not significantly associated with either measure 
of branch penetration. Finally, in column (10) we show that a regulatory barrier such as requiring 
approval by the financial regulator to open a branch is not significantly associated with lower 
branch penetration.
36  
In sum, the estimates in Tables 19 – 23 yield interesting results. The first one is obvious, GDP 
per capita is strongly positively associated with all measures of financial inclusion; it explains a 
large fraction of the cross-country variation. Second, after controlling for per capita income, 
variables which reflect the institutional and development conditions and that are largely outside 
of the control of financial regulators are also associated with a broader penetration of financial 
services. More specifically, measures of physical infrastructure, such as phone line penetration 
and electricity usage, are positively associated with all four measures of deposit penetration, loan 
penetration, and geographic and population based branch penetration. Lower inflation is also 
positively associated with deposit penetration. While these results probably confound the direct 
impact of better infrastructure or inflation control with other aspects of economic development 
and macroeconomic management, these results highlight the fact that some of the factors which 
affect the ability of policy makers to set conditions for greater financial inclusion are outside of 
their direct control. Third, there is also a significant relationship between measures of deposit 
and loan penetration and variables which might plausibly be within the control of financial 
regulators and policy makers. In particular, financial infrastructure, as measured by better 
                                                            
36 Cross-country analysis among richer countries shows that requiring branch approval is correlated with lower 
branch penetration. This relationship is statistically significant even after controlling for income, population density, 




contractual and informational environments in credit markets, is positively associated with 
broader lending. Similarly, the presence of deposit insurance is also associated with more deposit 
penetration
37 while higher levels of concentration in the banking sector are positively associated 
with more limited penetration of deposit and loans in the population, pointing to a possible role 
for competition policy in determining the degree of financial inclusion. Finally, while significant 
alone, once per capita income is taken into account, there is no significant association between 
increased financial penetration and the presence of any of the policies which have financial 
inclusion as a central goal. While cross-country OLS regressions are a very blunt tool and not 
really appropriate for measuring the impact of specific policies, these results support previous 
findings in the literature regarding the interaction between the macro/institutional environments 
and individual policies. These results, however, should not be interpreted as evidence of failure 
of any of these policies, but rather as a call for micro-studies to evaluate the effectiveness of 
measures aiming to improve access to financial services. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper introduces a new set of financial access indicators for 139 countries across the globe 
and describes the results of a preliminary analysis of the data. Despite its limitations, this data set 
is one of the few sources of information which could be used to asses and compare the degree of 
financial inclusion across countries. It also allows us to make back of the envelope estimates of 
the total number of bank accounts in the world and the number of individuals who have access to 
them. Despite the apparent overabundance of approximately 6.2 billion bank accounts in the 
world - more than one per adult - a disproportionate amount of the accounts - 3.2 per adult - are 
located in the developed world economies, while the equivalent figure in the developing world 
reaches is only approximately 0.9 per adult, inclusive of accounts which are not owned by 
individuals, such as those owned by government and business entities. In addition, our estimates 
indicate that roughly 19% of developed world adults do not have bank accounts (though many 
                                                            
37 Although the causal chain could easily run in the opposite direction, if deposit insurance schemes are more often 




may live in households where other members have accounts), whereas nearer to 72% of adults in 
the developing world do not have accounts. Even at the very low level of precision possible in 
this type of exercise, these numbers indicate a major gap that has not yet even begun to be 
addressed by the many policy initiatives currently underway or by the microfinance movement. 
Finally, we investigate the relationship between deposit, loan, and bank branch penetration with 
other variables and find significant associations of deposit and loan penetration with per capita 
income, physical and financial infrastructure, and macro-economic stability, but no significant 
association with policies which have financial inclusion as a central goal. 
 
Having appropriate data is crucial to understanding and measuring financial inclusion. The data 
introduced in the Financial Access Database should be viewed as an attempt to generate 
consistent cross-country indicators of financial penetration around the world. Yet, as an effort to 
document access to financial services worldwide, it faces many challenges. Many countries do 
not collect information on key variables and most have incomplete data on the non-banking 
sector. There is the need to improve the quality and availability of financial access data, both by 
improving and extending cross-country indicators as well as employing country-specific-in-
depth diagnostics. Additionally, data are often collected on an ad-hoc basis. To be useful, 
indicators must be collected on a repeated, regular basis, so that policymakers can set priorities 
and track changes. Finally, supply-side data must be complemented with other efforts, mainly 
through household surveys, to estimate accurately the characteristics of the population with 
access to the financial system. Since this could be a time and resource-intensive exercise, an 
alternative could be the use of quick financial access surveys or ‘snapshots’. These snapshots 
should not be intended to replace deeper country-level surveys, but could provide a usefully 
broad framework in which to set other sources of information. In the end, these efforts should 
complement each other to provide a broader picture of financial inclusion in order to identify 
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Table 1: Definitions of different bank types: Commercial banks, MOFIs, SSFIs, MFIs, and 
Other, as shown in the survey questionnaire.  
For each type, respondents were asked: (1) For each category, provide the type of the institutions that you 
supervise/regulate and (2) For each category, provide the type of the institutions that you do NOT supervise/regulate 
and indicate who does. 
DEFINITIONS 
Commercial Banks  
Banks with a full banking license. In some countries, the term 
universal banks, or other terms may be used. Majority 
government/State owned banks should be included in this category to 
the extent that they perform a broad set of retail banking functions 
Cooperatives, Credit Unions, & 
Mutuals  
These are financial institutions that are owned and controlled by their 
members (customers).  
Government Savings or 
Development Banks  
Specialized state owned institutions or extensions of the government 
whose main purpose is to lend to support economic development 
and/or to provide savings, payment, and deposit services to the 
public. (Includes postal banks, government savings banks, SME 
lending facilities, agriculture banks, development banks, etc.) 
Microfinance Institution  
Institutions whose primary business model is to lend to (and possibly 
take deposits from) the poor, often using specialized methodologies 
such as group lending.   
Other institutions providing loans 
and/or deposit services (institutions 
which do not fall into other 
categories) 
Any other financial institutions which do not fall into the above 
categories and provide standard loans and/or deposit services, for 








Table 2: Survey table requesting various data elements 
 

















(for the whole 
financial system) 
Indicate the number of institutions in each category  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Deposits (please enter full numbers) 
Total number of deposit accounts  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total number of checking deposit accounts  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total number of saving deposit accounts  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total number of time deposit accounts  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total value of deposit accounts  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total value of checking deposit accounts  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total value of saving deposit accounts  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total value of time deposit accounts  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total number of individuals with a deposit account  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Loans (please enter full numbers) 
Total number of outstanding loans  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total number of outstanding loans to non- [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total number of non-financial businesses with an  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total number outstanding loans to individuals  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total number of individuals with an outstanding  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total value of outstanding loans  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total value of outstanding loans to non-financial  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Total value of outstanding loans to individuals  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Retail Locations 
Total number of bank branches  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Number of bank branches in urban areas  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Number of bank branches in rural areas  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Banking Agents (Non-branch retail locations)  [   ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Payments - Please give system wide totals for the following:
Total number of debit/ATM cards in circulation  [   ]
Total number of ATM machines   [   ]
Total number of individuals with a debit/ATM card  [   ]
Total number of Point of Service terminals  [   ]
Total number of Point of Service transactions in the  [   ]
Year for which you provided the data  [   ] year
Comments  [   ]
 42 
 
Table 3: Sample table for classifying bank and non-bank institutions into 5 main 
categories. 
DEFINITIONS  
1. For each category, provide the 
type of  the institutions that you 
supervise/regulate 
2. For each category, provide the 
type of the institutions that you do 
NOT supervise/regulate and indicate 
who does 
Commercial Banks  
[Commercial Banks, Universal 
Banks] 
[n/a] 
Cooperatives, Credit Unions, & 
Mutuals  
[Credit Unions] 
[Urban and Rural Cooperatives, 
regulated by the Ministry of 
Cooperatives] 
Government Savings or 
Development Bank  
[Government Agricultural 
Development Bank] 
[Postal Bank, regulated by Ministry 
of Commerce] 
Microfinance Institution   [None] [n/a] 
Other institutions providing loans 
and/or deposit services  
[Municipal Savings and Loan 






Table 4: Supervisory arrangements for Banks and non-Banks 
Supervisory arrangement  Commercial 
Banks  MOFIs SSOFIs  MFIs 
Institutions in this category only 
supervised by commercial bank regulator  100.0% 41.5%  41.1%  34.6% 
Only some institutions in this category 
supervised by bank regulator   0.0% 16.2% 7.0%  9.2% 
Institutions in this category only 
supervised by other regulator  0.0% 16.9%  14.0% 7.7% 
No supervising authority reported for 
Institutions in this category   0.0% 25.4%  38.0%  48.5% 
Note: Frame is 129 respondents. 
 
 
Table 5: Data available on the number of deposits and loans is limited, especially for non-
banks.  
Data Available:  Commercial 
Banks  MOFIs SSOFIs  MFIs 
Data on Value of Deposits  118 42  32  22 
Data on Number of Deposit Accounts  83 24 20 17 
Data on Value of Loans  116 42  33  28 
Data on Number of Loans   63 18 15 18 
Data on Number of Individual Depositors  30 8  6 10 
Data on Number of Individual Borrowers  27 10  7  8 
Note: The data counting the numbers of individual depositors likely reflects much double counting because most 
respondents reported not being able to track individuals across multiple institutions even if they could ask banks for 











Table 6: Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for our main indicators.  All monetary values are expressed in 2008 US 
dollars. The exact definition of each variable is shown in Appendix 1. 
   N  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
25% Median 75% 
Commercial Banks         
Accounts / Adult population  85  996  995  270  702  1,498 
Av. Value of accounts
1 /  GDP per capita
2  72 2.6 5.6 0.4 0.9 2.4 
Loans / Adult population  65  299  304  42  214  430 
Branches / Adult population  119  16  15  5  12  23 
Branches / Sq km  119  33  138  1  6  21 
        
Cooperatives
3         
Accounts / Adult population  56  129  337  0  0.2  71 
Av. Value of accounts
1 /  GDP per capita
2  27 0.7 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 
Loans / Adult population  50  19  64  0  0  10 
Branches / Adult population  69  5  11  0  0.3  2.8 
Branches / Sq km  69  6  17  0  0.2  2.6 
        
Government Banks
3         
Accounts / Adult population  68  91  271  0  0  10 
Av. Value of accounts
1 /  GDP per capita
2 22  35  96.4  0.3  0.3  3.3 
Loans / Adult population  62  8.8  27.3  0  0  0.1 
Branches / Adult population  84  2.1  5.3  0  0  1.1 
Branches / Sq km  84  3.2  9.9  0  0  0.4 
        
MFIs
3         
Accounts / Adult population  70  9.3  28.2  0  0  0.3 
Av. Value of accounts
1 /  GDP per capita
2  15 0.8 1.7 0.1 0.2 0.5 
Loans / Adult population  70  7.9  18.5  0  0  1.8 
Branches / Adult population  77  1.1  3.1  0  0  0.7 
Branches / Sq km  77  1.6  8.7  0  0  0.2 
1.  The average value of accounts is calculated as the (Total Value of Deposit Accounts / Number of Accounts) 
2.  To facilitate comparisons, the statistics are for the sample of countries with available data on the number of 
accounts in commercial banks. 
3.  Includes countries where the cooperative sector (or government or microfinance sector, respectively) is not 





Table 7: Prediction models of the number of deposit accounts in commercial banks 
This table shows the estimates of OLS regressions of the number of deposit accounts in commercial banks per 
thousand adults on several covariates. Each column is represents a different regression. The dependent variable in 












ln(GDP/capita)  0.41**  0.44*** 0.63*** 0.68*** 0.83*** 
  (0.16) (0.084) (0.18) (0.090)  (0.069) 
High Inc. OECD (dummy)  -0.59**  -0.55*  -0.67*  -0.61*  -0.62* 
  (0.29) (0.28) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) 
ln(Population  Density)  0.090 0.14** 0.049  0.12*  0.17*** 
  (0.062) (0.053) (0.073) (0.064) (0.058) 
ln(Private Credit/GDP)  0.18  0.17  0.33**  0.35***   
  (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13)   
ln(Branches/100k  Adults)  0.53***  0.56***     
  (0.10)  (0.093)     
ln(Value  Deposits/Population)  0.041  0.062    
  (0.12)  (0.14)    
Constant  1.48*  1.21 1.11 0.84  -1.06* 
    (0.87) (0.77) (1.04) (0.94) (0.60) 
Observations  62 73 64 75 80 
R-squared  0.824 0.824 0.738 0.733 0.708 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 In these regressions and 













Table 8: Data sources and models used in the estimation of the number of accounts in 
commercial banks 
This table shows the distribution of data sources and models used to estimate the number of accounts in commercial 
banks around the world. The third column represents the percentage in terms of countries. The last column 
represents the percentage in terms of accounts.  
Data Source  # countries  % sample  % final count 
FA Survey '09 (Reported Data)  91  59%  48% 
BTP '08; BDM '07, CGAP 
internal numbers*  25 16% 22% 
Model 1 (branches volume)  17  11%  9% 
Model 2 (branches)  2  1%  0% 
Model 3 (volume)  6  4%  5% 
Model 4 (with private credit)  7  5%  1% 
Model 5 (without private credit)  6  4%  14% 
Totals 154  100%  100% 
* BTP = Banking the Poor (2008); BDM = Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez-Peria (2007), CGAP 
numbers were gathered in email exchanges between other CGAP staff and national regulator staff. 
 
Table 9: Prediction model of the number of deposit accounts in mutually owned institutions 
This table shows the estimates of OLS regressions of the number of deposit accounts in mutually owned institutions 
(cooperatives, credit unions, and Mutuals) per thousand adults on several covariates. The dependent variable in each 










Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** 






Table 10: Data sources used in the estimation of the number of MOFI accounts 
This table shows the distribution of data sources used to estimate the number of accounts in mutually owned 
financial institutions (MOFI) around the world. The third column represents the percentage in terms of countries. 
The last column represents the percentage in terms of accounts.  
Data Source  # countries  % sample 
% final 
count 
FA Survey '09  56  35%  56% 
WOCCU 52  33%  3% 
Predictions 15  9%  6% 
Set to 25th percentile  21  13%  2% 
EACB 13  8%  13% 
CGAP internal numbers  1  1%  20% 
Totals 158  100%  100% 
Notes: WOCCU is World Council of Credit Unions, ECBA is European Cooperative 
Banking Association, 25th percentile used only in "preferred estimate" 50th 
percentile used in "high estimate"; predictions based on regression, and CGAP 
internal numbers are for Japan and come from direct communication with regulator. 
 
Table 11: Data sources used in the estimation of the number of SSFI accounts 
This table shows the distribution of data sources used to estimate the number of accounts in SSFIs around the world. 
The third column represents the percentage in terms of countries. The last column represents the percentage in terms 
of accounts.  
Data Source  # countries  % sample 
% final 
count 
FA Survey '09  68  33%  78% 
CGAP "Big Numbers" *  141  67%  22% 
Totals 209  100%  100% 
Notes: CGAP "Big Numbers" refers to data gathered for  CCGAP, Occasional Paper 









Table 12: Data sources used in the estimation of the number of MFI accounts  
This table shows the distribution of data sources used to estimate the number of accounts in MFIs around the world. 
The third column represents the percentage in terms of countries. The last column represents the percentage in terms 
of accounts.  
Data Source 
# 
countries %  sample 
% final 
count 
FA Survey '09  14  16%  44% 
Microfinance Exchange (MIX)  75  84%  56% 
Totals 89  100%  100% 
Note: MIX numbers are values voluntarily reported by MFIs and aggregated to 
country level. 
 
Table 13: Estimates for numbers of accounts by income group and by category of 
providing instituion. 
This table shows the estimation for the number of accounts by income group and category of providing institution. 
Countries are divided according to the World Bank income group definition. The last column represents the 
percentage of accounts in non-bank institutions (MOFIs + SSFIs + MFIs).  
  Commercial 




Panel A: World 
Low Estimate  4.75 Bn  0.68 Bn  0.34 Bn  0.01 Bn  5.78 Bn   
Preferred Estimate  5.01 Bn  0.71 Bn  0.44 Bn  0.02 Bn  6.18 Bn  18.99% 
High Estimate  5.27 Bn  0.82 Bn  n.a.  n.a.  6.55 Bn   
Panel B: Middle income and developing countries 
Low Estimate  2.05 Bn  0.16 Bn  0.34 Bn  0.01 Bn  2.56 Bn   
Preferred Estimate  2.22 Bn  0.19 Bn  0.41 Bn  0.02 Bn  2.84 Bn  21.76% 
High Estimate  2.39 Bn  0.25 Bn  n.a.  n.a.  3.08 Bn   
Panel C: High Income countries 
Low Estimate  2.67 Bn  0.52 Bn  0.00 Bn  0.00 Bn  3.19 Bn   
Preferred Estimate  2.79 Bn  0.53 Bn  0.03 Bn  0.00 Bn  3.35 Bn  16.67% 
High Estimate  2.91 Bn  0.57 Bn  n.a.  n.a.  3.51 Bn   
Note: Value per 1000 adults numbers have as base, population from all countries (including those which we have 





Table 14: Reported rates of formal account ownership from household surveys and the 
logarithm of deposit penetration.  
This table shows the results of the OLS regressions of reported rates of formal account ownership from household 
surveys and the logarithm of deposit accounts per thousand adults. Column (1) is surveys taken after 2003, (2) are 
surveys after 2003 where the reported fraction is of all adults (rather than households) (3) is all available household 
surveys (going back to 2000). 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
ln(Deposits./ 1000 Adults)  25.2***  24.5***  24.8*** 
 (7.51)  (5.73)  (6.64) 
Constant -112.2***  -105.4***  -115.1*** 
 (-4.95)  (-3.51)  (-4.65) 
Observations 25  17  31 
R-squared 0.7101  0.6861  0.6034 






















Table 15: Household survey sources, years and countries 
Some of these data points are not used in the calculation of the conversion factor because no reported or predicted 
values for account numbers were available. 








Austria  European Commission  2008  97  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Belgium  European Commission  2008  99  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Botswana 
Claessens (2006) - 
FINSCOPE 2003  47  Household   
Cyprus  European Commission  2008  82  All Adults   
Czech Republic  European Commission  2008  83  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Denmark  European Commission  2008  99  All Adults  PR 
Estonia  European Commission  2008  84  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Finland  European Commission  2008  94  All Adults  PR 
France  European Commission  2008  98  All Adults  PR 
Germany  European Commission  2008  97  All Adults  PR 
Greece European  Commission  2008  72  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Hungary  European Commission  2008  66  All Adults  PR, CB 
India (UP and AP)  Claessens (2006) - RFAS  2003  47.5  Household   
Ireland  European Commission  2008  88  All Adults  PR 
Italy  European Commission  2008  84  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Latvia  European Commission  2008  52  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Lesotho 
Claessens  (2006) - 
FINSCOPE 2003  17  Household   
Lithuania  European Commission  2008  59  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Luxembourg European  Commission 2008  99  All  Adults  PR 
Malawi  FINSCOPE  2008  17  All Adults  PR, CB 
Malta  European Commission  2008  79  All Adults   
Namibia 
Claessens  (2006) - 
FINSCOPE 2003  28.4  Household   
Netherlands  European Commission  2008  99  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Nigeria FINSCOPE  2008  13.9  All  Adults  PR 
Pakistan  FINSCOPE  2008  3  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Panama  Tejerina and Westley (2007)  2003  35.2  Household   
Poland  European Commission  2008  60  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Portugal  European Commission  2008  83  All Adults  PR 
Rwanda  FINSCOPE   2008  14  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Slovakia  European Commission  2008  74  All Adults  PR 
Slovenia  European Commission  2008  94  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
South Africa 
Claessens  (2006) - 
FINSCOPE 2004  46  Household   
Spain  European Commission  2008  92  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
Swaziland 
Claessens  (2006) - 
FINSCOPE 2003  35.3  Household   
Sweden  European Commission  2008  98  All Adults  PR 
Uganda  FINSCOPE  2007  19  All Adults  R, PR, CB 
UK  European Commission  2008  94  All Adults  PR 
*Note: R = used in "reported totals only" conversion factor calculation, RP = "reported and predicted" calculation, 
CB = "commercial banks only" calculation 
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Table 16: Computation methods of the “conversion factor” 
This table shows the results of the so-called conversion factor using three different methodologies. The conversion 
factor is calculated, for each country for which household data are available, as the total number of deposit accounts 
divided by the number of individuals who have savings/deposit accounts in formal financial institutions. This factor 
is a proxy for the average number of accounts per account holder. Such proxy is not perfect, since the figure for the 
total number of accounts include not only individual accounts, but also business and government accounts. For 
reported totals only, the sample was restricted to countries with reported account data and household survey data. In 
the  reported and predicted row, we use countries with household survey data and account data, regardless of 
whether it were reported or predicted data. Finally, in the last row, labeled comm. bank accounts, we use a sample of 
countries with household survey data and commercial bank reported account data. The columns present the mean, as 
well as the 90% confidence interval. 
   
Conversion 
Factor 90%  C.I. 
Conversion Factor Calculation 
Method #  Obs.  Mean  -  + 
Using reported totals only  15  3.0    2.0  3.9 
Using reported and predicted  28  3.2    2.6  3.9 
Using reported comm. bank accts.  17    2.5*    1.6  3.4 
Notes: *The conversion factor from reported commercial bank accounts is not necessarily comparable to the 
others since it will use generate the number of banked adults from the number of commercial bank accounts 
only. 
 
Table 17: Estimation of the number of banked people using the three different conversion 
factors 
This table shows the estimation of the banked population using three different methodologies to estimate the so-
called conversion factor. The conversion factor is calculated, for each country for which household data are 
available, as the total number of deposit accounts divided by the number of individuals who have savings/deposit 
accounts in formal financial institutions. For reported totals only, the sample was restricted to countries with 
reported account data and household survey data. In the reported and predicted row, we use countries with 
household survey data and account data, regardless of whether it were reported or predicted data. Finally, in the last 
row, labeled comm. bank accounts, we use a sample of countries with household survey data and commercial bank 
reported account data. 
Conversion Factor Calculation 
Method  Region  Estimate for 
Number Banked 
% Adult Pop. 
Banked 
   World  1.78 Bn  38% 
Using reported totals only  High Income  0.70 Bn  81% 
   Developing  1.08 Bn  28% 
   World  1.91 Bn  41% 
Using reported and predicted  High Income  0.74 Bn  86% 
   Developing  1.17 Bn  31% 
   World  1.71 Bn  37% 
Using reported comm. bank accounts  High Income  0.65 Bn  75% 
 Developing  1.06  Bn  28% 
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Table 18: Prediction model for the number of loans per thousand adults 
This table shows the estimates of OLS regressions of the number of loans per thousand adults on a quadratic 
function of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita and the 2008 Credit Information Index of Doing Business. Our 
preferred specification is presented in column (1).  
 (1)  (2) 
ln(GPD per capita)  3.18***   
 (0.65)   
ln(GPD per capita)
2 -0.14***   
 (0.04)   
ln(Value of Loans per 1000 adults)    2.31*** 
   (0.29) 
ln(Value of Loans per 1000 adults)
 2   --0.10*** 
   (0.02) 
Credit Information Index  0.09**  0.07* 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
Constant -11.57***  -6.04*** 
 (2.50)  (1.04) 
Observations 69  58 
Adjusted R-squared  0.817  0.867 














Table 19: Cross-country correlations between measures of deposit account penetration, 
loan penetration, and demographic penetration of branches and country characteristics 
This table summarizes the pairwise correlations between measures of deposit account penetration, loan penetration, 
and demographic penetration of branches and different country characteristics. Each cell displays the pairwise 
correlation between the variable at the top of the column and the covariate in the corresponding row. The definition 
of each variable is shown in Appendix 1. ***= significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = 

















squared km in 
commercial banks 
(logs)
GDP per capita (log)  0.80***  0.86***  0.77***  0.53*** 
Population Density (log)  0.25**  -0.04  0.08  0.79*** 
Gini -0.16  0.16  -0.25**  -0.45*** 
Inflation -0.46***  -0.24**  -0.30***  -0.31*** 
Deposit  Insurance  0.46***  0.51*** 0.38*** 0.30*** 
Electricity  consumption  0.74***  0.80*** 0.70*** 0.44*** 
Phone  lines  0.84***  0.85*** 0.79*** 0.59*** 
Road  density  0.53***  0.42*** 0.49*** 0.82*** 
Absence  of  violence  0.49***  0.46*** 0.53*** 0.32*** 
Offshore 0.21**  0.20  0.18**  0.37*** 
Concentration -0.28**  -0.35***  -0.18*  -0.23** 
Government bank share  -0.18  -0.19  -0.21*  -0.11 
Foreign  bank  share  -0.02  -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
KYC requirements  -0.18*  -0.05  -0.24***  -0.15* 
Basic Accounts (Exc.)  -0.17  -0.03  -0.16  0.07 
Basic Accounts (Req.)  0.11  0.13  0.18**  0.10 
Documents required  -0.22  -0.05  -0.07  -0.28* 
Min. Bal. Open checking  -0.44***  -0.41*** -0.46*** -0.33*** 
Checking annual fee  -0.50***  -0.44**  -0.58***  -0.41*** 
Tax incentives  0.28***  0.25**  0.25***  0.12 
Operations agents (savings)  0.20*  0.20  0.11  0.11 
Postal Network  0.35***  0.28**  0.29***  0.31*** 
Contract enforcement   -0.47***  -0.32***  -0.43***  -0.28*** 
Creditor Rights Index  0.37***  0.31**  0.25***  0.28*** 
Creditor  Inf.  Index  0.48***  0.60*** 0.52*** 0.32*** 
Places to submit loan  0.51*** 0.63***  0.52*** 0.25* 
Minimum loan  -0.32**  -0.34*  -0.36**  -0.14 
Fee consumer loan  -0.17  0.06  -0.02  -0.18 
Days process loan  -0.27*  -0.24  -0.21  -0.06 
Operations agents (credit)  0.17  0.22*  0.14  0.10 
Branch  approval  -0.08  -0.09 -0.28*** -0.08 
       54 
 
Table 20: Cross-country covariates associated with deposit account penetration 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the (logarithm of) number of accounts per thousand adults in commercial banks on different country 
characteristics. Each column in each panel represents the result of one regression. The definition of each variable is shown in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***= significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  0.68*** 0.66*** 0.75*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.40***  0.21*  0.69*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
Population  Density  (log)    0.15*  0.35*** 0.14  0.16* 0.13* 0.13*  0.16  0.15*  0.14 0.14**  -0.30* 
    (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.15) 
Gini     0.00           
     ( 0 . 0 1 )            
Inflation      -0.02***          
      ( 0 . 0 1 )           
Deposit  Insurance       0.34**         
       ( 0 . 1 6 )          
Electricity  consumption        0.25**        
        ( 0 . 1 3 )         
Phone  lines         0.47***       
         ( 0 . 1 1 )        
Road  density          -0.06      
          ( 0 . 1 3 )       
Absence  of  violence          0.09     
           ( 0 . 1 0 )      
Offshore            0.20    
            ( 0 . 3 1 )     
Branches  per  adult  (log)             0.45***   
             ( 0 . 1 4 )    
Branches per km
2  (log)              0.44*** 
              ( 0 . 1 3 )  
Constant  0.90 0.37 -1.13 0.81 0.49 0.75  3.05***  0.29 0.63 0.44  1.33**  3.78*** 
  (0.54) (0.69) (1.34) (0.71) (0.66) (0.75) (0.80) (1.02) (0.69) (0.72) (0.59) (1.08) 
N  85 85 38 81 84 72 84 59 85 85 83 83 
R




Table 20 (Cont): Cross-country covariates associated with deposit account penetration 
  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  0.61*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.66*** 0.70*** 0.66*** 0.81*** 0.59*** 0.61*** 0.68*** 0.66*** 0.64*** 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Population  Density  (log)  0.13*  0.13**  0.19***  0.15* 0.09 0.15*  0.19*  0.15***  0.24***  0.15*  0.15* 0.13 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Concentration  -0.63             
  ( 0 . 4 3 )              
Government  bank  share   0.16            
    ( 0 . 3 5 )             
Foreign  bank  share     0.19           
     ( 0 . 2 6 )            
KYC  requirements      -0.02          
      ( 0 . 0 4 )           
Basic  Accounts  (Exc.)       0.18         
       ( 0 . 2 1 )          
Basic  Accounts  (Req.)        0.12        
        ( 0 . 1 7 )         
Documents  required         -0.00       
         ( 0 . 1 3 )        
Min.  Bal.  Open  checking          0.00      
          ( 0 . 0 1 )       
Checking  annual  fee           -0.01     
           ( 0 . 0 1 )      
T a x   i n c e n t i v e s             - 0 . 1 7     
            ( 0 . 1 6 )     
Operations  agents  (savings)             0.09   
             ( 0 . 2 1 )    
P o s t a l   N e t w o r k               0 . 2 1  
              ( 0 . 1 7 )  
Constant  1.31*  1.16*  0.84 0.49 0.23  0.37*  -0.92 0.97 0.47 0.24 0.40 0.53 
  (0.69) (0.61) (0.62) (0.83) (0.85) (0.69) (1.64) (0.57) (0.90) (0.70) (0.70) (0.73) 
N  82 56 56 85 66 85 32 51 36 85 85 85 
R
2  0.67 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.78 0.67 0.67 0.67 56 
 
 
Table 21: Cross-country covariates associated with the loan penetration 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the (logarithm of) number of loans per thousand adults in commercial banks on different country 
characteristics. Each column in each panel represents the result of one regression. The definition of each variable is shown in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***= significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  1.05*** 1.05*** 0.99*** 1.04*** 0.57** 0.60*** 1.01*** 1.08*** 1.04*** 1.02*** 0.93*** 0.66*** 0.97*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.21)  (0.19) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Pop.  Density  (log)    -0.05               
    ( 0 . 0 8 )                
Gini     0.01              
     ( 0 . 0 1 )               
Inflation      -0.01            
      ( 0 . 0 1 )             
Elect.  consumption       0.40*          
       ( 0 . 2 2 )           
Phone  lines         0.46***         
         ( 0 . 1 7 )          
Road  density           0.06        
           ( 0 . 1 6 )         
Contract  enforcement            0.00       
            ( 0 . 0 0 )        
Absence  of  violence            0.06      
             ( 0 . 1 6 )       
Creditor  Rights  Index              0.07**     
              ( 0 . 0 4 )      
Creditor  Inf.  Index               0.14***    
               ( 0 . 0 5 )     
Branches  per  adult  (log)                0.66***   
                ( 0 . 1 3 )    
Branches per km
2  (log)                 0.10 
                 ( 0 . 0 8 )  
Constant  -3.4*** -3.2*** -3.0*** -3.2*** -2.3**  -0.7  -3.4*** -3.8*** -3.2*** -3.6*** -2.9*** -1.81**  -2.53* 
  (0.77) (0.78) (0.84) (0.77)  (0.91)  (1.30) (0.96) (1.00) (0.82) (0.75) (0.79) (0.71) (0.99) 
N  65 65 33 64  53  64 42 65 65 65 65 64 64 
R




Table 21 (Cont): Cross-country covariates associated with the loan penetration 
  (12)  (13) (14) (15)  (16)  (17) (18) (19) 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  1.00***  0.98*** 0.93*** 0.96***  0.92***  0.92*** 0.92*** 1.04*** 
  (0.08)  (0.12) (0.13) (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) 
Concentration  -1.40***           
  ( 0 . 4 6 )            
Government  bank  share    0.03          
    ( 0 . 9 1 )           
Foreign  bank  share      -0.28         
      (0.43)         
Places to submit loan        -0.05         
       ( 0 . 1 0 )        
Minimum  loan        0.00     
        ( 0 . 0 0 )      
Fee  consumer  loan          -0.06    
          ( 0 . 0 9 )     
Days process loan              0.01   
            ( 0 . 0 2 )    
Operations  agents  (credit)             0.38 
             ( 0 . 3 9 )  
Constant -2.1***  -2.7***  -2.1*  -2.4*** -2.2*  -2.1  -2.2*  -3.4*** 
  (0.72)  (1.01) (1.12) (1.07)  (1.25)  (1.32) (1.15) (0.76) 
N  64  42 39 32  30  27 31 65 
R







Table 22: Cross-country covariates associated with the demographic penetration of branches 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the (logarithm of) number of branches per thousand adults in commercial banks on different country 
characteristics. Each column in each panel represents the result of one regression. The definition of each variable is shown in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***= significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  0.51***  0.58*** 0.50*** 0.30***  0.22***  0.48*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 
  (0.03)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Population  Density  (log)  0.02  0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
  (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Gini    -0.02*            
    ( 0 . 0 1 )             
Inflation      -0.01           
      ( 0 . 0 1 )            
Electricity  consumption       0.22**         
       ( 0 . 0 9 )          
Phone  lines        0.34***       
        ( 0 . 0 7 )        
Road  density          0.13      
          ( 0 . 0 9 )       
Contract  enforcement            -0.00     
            ( 0 . 0 0 )      
Absence  of  violence             0.04    
             ( 0 . 0 9 )     
Concentration              -0.16   
              ( 0 . 4 0 )    
B r a n c h   a p p r o v a l                - 0 . 0 2  
               ( 0 . 1 6 )  
Constant -2.0***  -1.6  -1.8***  -1.8***  -0.3  -2.0*** -1.7*** -1.9*** -1.7*** -1.8*** 
  (0.41)  (1.01) (0.44) (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.56) (0.47) (0.49) (0.57) (0.46) 
N  119  49  115 102  118  84  119 118 115 116 
R





Table 23: Cross-country covariates associated with the geographic penetration of branches 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the (logarithm of) number of branches per squared km in commercial banks on different country 
characteristics. Each column in each panel represents the result of one regression. The definition of each variable is shown in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***= significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  0.58***  0.67*** 0.57*** 0.31***  0.24***  0.54*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 
  (0.03)  (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Population  Density  (log)  1.03***  1.06*** 1.02*** 1.03***  1.00***  0.95*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 
  (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Gini    -0.02**            
    ( 0 . 0 1 )             
Inflation      -0.01           
      ( 0 . 0 1 )            
Electricity  consumption       0.28***         
       ( 0 . 1 0 )          
Phone  lines        0.41***       
        ( 0 . 0 7 )        
Road  density          0.16      
          ( 0 . 1 0 )       
Contract  enforcement            -0.00     
            ( 0 . 0 0 )      
Absence  of  violence             0.04    
             ( 0 . 1 0 )     
Concentration              -0.23   
              ( 0 . 4 0 )    
B r a n c h   a p p r o v a l                - 0 . 0 3  
               ( 0 . 1 7 )  
Constant  -7.6***  -7.0*** -7.4*** -7.4***  -5.6***  -7.5*** -7.2*** -7.5*** -7.2*** -7.4*** 
  (0.44)  (1.10) (0.48) (0.52)  (0.55)  (0.60) (0.50) (0.52) (0.59) (0.49) 
N  119  49  115 102  118  84  119 118 115 116 
R




Figure 1: Added variable plot from Model (1) in Table 8. 
This figure shows the line of best fit from Model (1) in Table 8, namely, the OLS regression between the rates of 
formal account ownership from household surveys and the logarithm of deposit accounts per thousand adults.  The 









































































Figure 2: Numbers of commercial bank accounts from Financial Access Survey against 
numbers of accounts in deposit money banks collected in 2008 and 2003 
This figure shows the correlation between the number of accounts per thousand adults collected in the Financial 
Access Survey and previous data. The left panel shows the correlation with the same figure as collected by the 
World Bank (2008). The right panel presents the correlation with the numbers collected by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 










Figure 3: Deposit penetration and income per capita (Actual and predicted values) 
This figure shows the actual and predicted values (Model 1) of accounts in commercial banks per thousand adults 
and income per capita. The blue dots represent the actual values. The red crosses represent the predicted values. 
 
Figure 4: Predicted and actual values using Model 1.  
This figure shows the actual and predicted values (Model 1) of accounts in commercial banks per thousand adults.  
Spain and Italy are outliers due to their large cooperative sectors, which function as banks but are not counted in 
commercial bank data. 
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Figure 5: Number of deposit accounts in banks and regulated non-bank financial 
institutions per thousand adults 
This figure shows the worldwide distribution of deposit accounts in banks and regulated non-bank financial 
institutions per thousand adults. Predicted values are used when data are not available.  
 
Figure 6: Number of bank loans per thousand adults in commercial banks 
This figure shows the worldwide distribution of deposit accounts in banks and regulated non-bank financial 




Appendix 1: Variables 
Variable Description  Source 
GDP per capita  Gross Domestic Product per capita in current dollars of 2007  World Development Indicators 
Population Density  Total number of people in 2008 divided by the area of land measured in km²  World Development Indicators 
Adult Population  Adult population in 2008. When the 2008 data are not available, we use the most recent  World Development Indicators 
Population  Total population in 2008. When the 2008 data are not available, we use the most recent  World Development Indicators 
Branches per adult  Number of branches per 100,000 adults  Financial Access Database (2009) 
Branches per sq km  Number of branches per squared km  Financial Access Database (2009) 
Credit Information Index  Scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with scope, access, and quality of credit 
information 
World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators, 2009 
Gini  Gini coefficient for income inequality in each country (5-year average 2003-2007)  World Development Indicators 
Inflation  10 year average (1998-2008) of the change in the CPI in each country  International Financial Statistics 
Deposit Insurance  Equals one if the country had an explicit deposit insurance in 2003 and zero otherwise.  Demirgüç-Kunt., Karacaovali, and 
Laeven (2005) 
Electricity Consumption  Watts-hour consumption per capita in 2006  World Development Indicators 
Phone Lines  Total telephone mainlines per thousand people (5-year average 2003-2007)  World Development Indicators 
Road Density  Kilometers of roads per 100 km² of land area (5-year average 2003-2007)  World Development Indicators 
Absence of Violence  Sub-Index of Political Stability / No Violence, 2008  World Bank Governance Indicators 
Offshore  Equals one if the country was defined by the IMF as an offshore center in 2008  IMF 
Concentration  Share of deposits in the five largest banks  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
Government Bank Share  Percentage of banking system assets in banks 50% + owned by government  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
Foreign Bank Share  Percentage of banking system assets in banks 50% + owned by foreign entities  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
KYC Requirements 
An index aggregating the documentation required to open a checking account. This 
includes: (1) Government issued ID, (2) Any ID, (3) Proof of nationality or legal status, (4) 
Proof of address, (5) Proof of income, (6) Proof of employment, and (7) Other 
Financial Access Database (2009) 
Basic Accounts (Exc.)  Equals one if there were regulatory exceptions for low income people in 2008 to the 
documentation requirements for opening a bank checking account  Financial Access Database (2009) 
Basic Accounts (Req.)  Equals one if there are, among the policies to promote access to finance, regulatory 
requirements for banks to offer a basic or low fee account.  Financial Access Database (2009) 
Documents Required  The average number of documents (in the 5 largest banks) required to open a checking 
account in 2008. 
World Bank, Banking the Poor 
(2008) 
Min. Bal. open checking 
Minimum balance required to open a checking account expressed as a percent of GDP. It 
combines two databases. When data were available in both data sets, the variable takes the 
latest value. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt., and 
Martinez-Peria (2008) and World 
Bank, Banking the Poor (2008) 65 
 
 
Appendix 1 (Cont): Variables 
Variable Description  Source 
Checking annual fee  Fees associated with maintaining a checking account expressed as percent of GDP per 
capita in 2004 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt., and 
Martinez-Peria (2008) 
Tax incentives 
Equals one if a country claims that it has pursued tax incentive savings schemes (such as 
tax incentives for retirement, education, or medical savings) to promote financial access 
and zero otherwise.  
Financial Access Database (2009) 
Operations agents (savings) 
This index is an equally weighted mean of responses to the following survey questions: (1) 
Agents are allowed to receive and forward applications to open accounts; (2) Agents are 
allowed to open accounts on behalf of the bank; (3) Agents to accept funds for deposit in 
the client's bank account and; (4) Agents to pay withdrawals from client's bank account. 
Financial Access Database (2009) 
Postal Network  Equals one if financial services are offered in the post offices and these services are 
handled by a separate private operator (typically a bank) and zero otherwise.  Financial Access Database (2009) 
Contract Enforcement  Total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment and court fees expressed as 
percentage of total debt in 2008 
World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators, 2008 
Creditor Rights Index  Index of creditor rights following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)  World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators, 2008 
Minimum loan  Lowest amount of consumer loan banks make expressed as a percent of GDP per capita in 
2004 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt., and 
Martinez-Peria (2008) 
Fee consumer loan  Fee banks charge on consumer loans expressed as percent of GDP per capita in 2004  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt., and 
Martinez-Peria (2008) 
Days process loan  Number of days banks take to process a typical consumer loan application in 2004  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt., and 
Martinez-Peria (2008) 
Operations agents (credit) 
This index is an equally weighted mean of responses to the following survey questions: (1) 
Agents to receive and forward loan requests to the bank; (2) Agents to conduct credit 
evaluations and to approve loans on behalf of the bank; (3) Agents to collect loan payments 
on behalf of the bank. 
Financial Access Database (2009) 
Branch Approval  Equals one if the Supervisor/Regulator approval is required to open each bank branch and 
zero otherwise in 2008.  Financial Access Database (2009) 
 
 
 